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Whether motivated by efforts to reduce the state or by groups seeking to empower forest communities, forest devolution policies have generated high expectations. Transferring forest management authority from poorly funded, top-heavy bureaucracies to forest users with interests in maintaining a healthy and productive forest will save the state money, improve forest quality, provide greater benefits to those who need and deserve them, and make decision making more democratic. Or so the thinking goes. 1 Unfortunately, from the perspective of the poorest forest usersthe small-scale farmers and goat herders; the collectors of fodder, medicinal plants, or fuelwood; the woodcarvers, leaf-plate makers, and other artisans-the outcomes have often been disappointing. There are instances where forests have grown healthier, where the poor enjoy greater access to forest products and income, and where decision making about these landscapes has become more democratic. In most places, however, increases in forest cover and quality have occurred at the cost of forest uses that supported the livelihoods of the poor. Tangible benefits accrued to local users have been meager, unreliable, and captured mostly by local elites. Forestry officials have retained control of key decisions through burdensome regulations, taxes, and lengthy approval processes. Introduction
The Asian context of devolution policy has been distinctive for its large numbers of people living in and depending on forests, extensive state ownership of forestlands, highly organized and centralized forest bureaucracies, and two-decade history of devolution policies. Struggles between states and their citizens over forest management issues have often been intense, generating constant pressure for reforms. The cases in this issue focus on the countries with the longest, and most complex, histories of formal devolution policies: Nepal, India, China, and the Philippines. These cases identify four clear patterns in devolution policy history.
First, devolution policies emerged in response to centralist ideologies, institutional structures, and social relations that dominated governments during much of this century. Government officials often controlled reforms, however, and so these older ideas, structures, and relations greatly influenced the content and implementation of devolution policies. The cases by Yam Malla and Francisco Magno presented in this issue, for example, suggest that when foresters cling to a belief in the superiority of scientific management, when they remain accountable to bureaucratic superiors, and when they maintain ties to local elite, devolution policies leave the poorest forest users worse off than before. Their analyses suggest the need for further reform that weakens or eliminates these historical holdovers.
Second, historical analysis reminds us that forest management by local people was interrupted and distorted by years of centralized control. The idea that devolution can recreate the precolonial days of community-based forest management, where it existed, is untenable. As the papers by Liu Dachang and Ramachandra Guha indicate, many forests have been drastically altered, now dominated by evergreen rather than broadleaf trees, depopulated of wild animals, with plant species better suited to international markets than local uses. The contexts of forest management have changed with new tenurial regimes, technologies, and new pressures for use. Capacities that existed in the past may not have kept pace with these changes. While some local forest management institutions have survived, others are now gone, with little local memory of how they functioned, or even interest in recreating them. This suggests that devolution requires in some places the continued involvement of the state in supporting local management. States may struggle with their capacity and legitimacy to play such a role, as all four papers suggest. The rise of forest-based social movements and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in recent decades provides states with potential partners for the task, though the persistence of elite/subordinate relations at local levels makes every partner potentially problematic, as Malla points out.
Third, forest users themselves have promoted more democratic, devolved forest management by mobilizing on their own or, more often, in alliance with other civil society groups and progressive government officials. These alliances have been around for some time, as Guha makes clear, and have influenced the development of existing devolution policies in most cases. Their influence thus far has been limited relative to that of holdover officials and local elites. New discourses about democracy, indigenous rights and conservation, however, will encourage further, more democratic reforms.
Finally, historical analysis suggests the importance of learning from the outcomes of past policy interventions in a more systematic and collaborative manner. Policymakers have adapted devolution policies over the years in response to new political climates and management opportunities and concerns. The increasing attention to biodiversity conservation and protected area management are examples (see Liu, Malla, and Guha). Where policy has been treated in an experimental fashion, as in southern China, and where there has been broader participation in the policy evaluation and reformulation process, as in some places in India and the Philippines, policy improvements have been more dramatic.
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Even in countries touted as devolution successes, many officials believe that forest management should remain in the hands of forest departments. Individually and institutionally, they have sought to maintain their benefits and control by adjusting their relations with other key actors and by revising their rhetoric. This has been one of the most important barriers to effective devolution.
In China and Nepal, foresters have argued that only they have the technical and managerial skills to manage forests, that local forest users do not, and that therefore foresters must maintain regulatory and supervisory powers in even local forest management. As Guha discusses, in India, conservationists have argued that the state must protect "public" interests in forests. In many countries, high-ranking officials have limited the application of devolution policies to low-quality forests, or forests with special histories or characteristics. Regulations in India have in most states limited the Joint Forest Management program to forests with less than 40 percent forest cover until very recently. 4 Malla highlights the reluctance of the Nepali government to devolve forest management authority to communities in the terai. It is in the terai, after all, that foresters can make money from controlling the harvest of valuable timber species, ostensibly for the "public" good. 5 These ideological positions sometimes have been paired with specific material interest. Officials at all levels of the bureaucracy can use forests as lucrative sources of income, both legal and illegal. Parastatal forest industries and concession systems on state forestland have provided government budgets with much of their income, allowing for employment, infrastructure development, and other expenditures in the forest service (see Malla and Liu) . Illegal income, however, may have been even more important for local-level officials. In the field, officials have bent rules for villagers in exchange for small gifts and imposed fines on those who haven't paid in advance. Officials have set up forest-related businesses for themselves or friends based on their preferential access to forest resources and product markets. 6 The pattern is often repeated at the central level, though at a larger scale and with larger stakes. Introduction Departments have devolved responsibilities for planting, weeding, and protecting forests to other actors, often the poorest forest users, while continuing to control what species are planted, when they are harvested, to whom forest products are sold, and what is done with the benefits. Forest users have gained little in the way of decision-making authority. What has been transferred instead is a substantial burden of time and labor, making them little more than subcontractors to forestry departments. 8 As Malla demonstrates, officials also can discipline local decision makers by dominating either newly created "community" organizations or by assuming leadership roles in existing community organizations. 9 Accountability and financing mechanisms have been put in place that make local institutions dependent on officials at regional or national levels. 10 As Liu discusses, in China, the Forest Department maintained control through tax and licensing policies for timber production and sales that prevented farmers from realizing much benefit from the trees that were suddenly theirs to "manage" under dramatic tenure reforms. In India and Nepal, non-timber forest products (NTFPs) have also been subject to market controls and taxes. 11 The paperwork associated with devolution policies can itself become a tangled web of procedures that defy easy comprehension by forest users, assuming they have access to the information at all. 12 Officials decipher and guide villagers through the procedures that supposedly grant local control over forest management. The potential for creative interpretations on the part of officials is high, assuring that their broad and effective authority is maintained. 13 Field-level officials have considerable scope to slow the implementation of devolution policies even where senior officials mandate their implementation, particularly in states with weak central governments (and there more and more of these with global-scale pressures for liberalization). This is not generally a matter of formal administrative autonomy so much as the ability of local officials to control the flow of information about policy implementation up the chain of accountability.
14 This may help explain the slow pace of registration of forest user groups in Nepal, even in the middle hills, as field officers drag their feet in a process that they oppose. 15 As Magno indicates, the limited implementation of community-based forestry programs in the Philippines has also been attributed in part to the reluctance of local officials to take the programs on in a serious way. 16 Yet foresters often seem so enthusiastic about devolution? Some of this enthusiasm may be a performance for the benefit of other actors to give the illusion that much more is happening on the ground than there is in fact. As Manor suggests, it is foolish to ignore such "theatrical and imaginary dimensions of politics." 17 Senior officials have passed policies that they have little hope or expectation will ever be implemented, often in order to secure donor funding. 18 Malla claims that many of Nepal's forest user groups are little more than organizations on paper, designed to keep the aid money flowing for study trips, secondments, and other perks for forestry officials. Similar comments have been made about policies in the Philippines and India supporting community-based forestry. Ruth Alsop et al. point out from case work in India that local officials too are "adept at developing strategic relationships in villages so that they can display the occasional ritual of farmer dialogue." 19 Foot dragging, dissembling, and the like are not just weapons of the remote villager, but can be of the state official as well. Despite the rhetoric of reform, forest departments have found ways to protect their own ideologies, interests, and practices.
Local elites-large landholders, traders, traditional leaders, and other individuals who have had power to influence many of their neighbors in matters of forest management-are informal policy makers. They shape the outcome of devolution policies in every country, generally against the interests of the poor. As Malla points out, elite power often predates the formation of the nation-state and is maintained through reforms and revolutions. Colonization, in fact, often strengthened particular groups of elite vis-à-vis other members of their communities. Colonial administrations, inspired by a need to extract resources in an efficient manner and by a political strategy of divide and rule, supported the development of local "strongmen," as Joel Migdal calls them. 20 These men exercised authority within limited territories usually defined by ethnicity or kin relations and were often hostile to the development of national-scale independence movements. As Malla notes, local bureaucrats are reluctant to challenge the position of local elites if they depend on elite influence to perform their duties under conditions of limited government capacity.
Certainly local elites face opposition within their communities from poorer groups. But fear of retribution may prevent the poor from exercising their informal and even legal rights. As Migdal suggests:
States undertaking reforms have not targeted social policy at a free floating clientele but at people susceptible to the sanctions of the local, threatened leaders. Potential clients might face the inability to secure a tenancy, the denial of credit, the loss of a job, or even assassination. Their current working strategies of survival have tempered any inclinations they might have had to clamor for their rightful benefits from state policies and to finger the implementors as the villain in the implementation process. Moreover, their fear of undermining their strategies of survival, in which the strongmen play such an important part, have discouraged vulnerable peasants and workers from confronting government officials for not giving them their due.
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Thus collectors of non-timber forest products in Madhya Pradesh have generally refused to speak out against the traders who exploit them, for fear of losing access to the credit and supplies that the traders provide. In Indonesia, villagers have been unable to assert control over their customary forests in the face of likely retribution from elites involved in illegal timber harvesting. 22 Elites have used other strategies to pursue their interests as well. As Malla reports, wealthy landowners have assumed positions of leadership in many Forest User Groups in Nepal, as well as in the federation of user groups, FECOFUN. As a result, forest protection has dominated the debates over forest management rather than the access rights of the poor to forest products they depend on. Similarly, elite men in India have used their influence in Village Protection Committees and other local institutions to ban headloading by poor women in order to assure regeneration of timber species from which they can profit. 23 The persistence of elite/subordinate relations helps explain the failure of devolution policies. Introduction
Other problems associated with devolution policies have to do with the capacity of the poorest forest users themselves. They not always have the technical, institutional, or organizational capacity to take on devolved forest management under current conditions. The problem is not inherent to forest users but the result of specific historical experiences. First, years of centralized forestry often altered the kinds of species and communities found in the forest, and local users sometimes lack experience in managing such altered forests. Second, centralized forest management has caused local knowledge and institutional forms to atrophy or develop in directions that are not helpful for an expanded set of rights to forest management. Particularly where the state has been effective in excluding locals from all but the most clandestine, hurried, and uncoordinated kinds of forest exploitation, there may be little relevant capacity left within communities recently empowered to manage forests. Third, new pressures for use of the forest and new technologies for managing it have developed. To be successful for poorer forest users, devolution needs to include possibilities for users to obtain outside technical and institutional support. 24 Under centralized control, state interventions in forestry have focused on the management of a few commercially valuable species. As a result, foresters have transformed natural forests into plantations or near-plantations in many areas (Magno and Guha). Local technical knowledge of diverse products and complex links among them is of little relevance in plantations. James Scott makes the general case for the displacement of local knowledge in a transformed landscape:
One of the major purposes of state simplifications, collectivization, assembly lines, plantations, and planned communities alike is to strip down reality to the bare bones so that the rules will in fact explain more of the situations and provide a better guide to behavior. . . . If the environment can be simplified down to the point where the rules do explain a great deal, those who formulate the rules and techniques have also greatly expanded their power. They have, correspondingly, diminished the power of those who do not. To the degree that they do succeed, cultivators with a high degree of autonomy, skills, experience, self-confidence, and adaptability are replaced by cultivators following instructions. 25 In the hills of Uttar Pradesh, as Guha describes it, oak forests were replaced by chir pine during the colonial period. This amounted to a replacement of a locally valuable species-and all its associated species of plants and animals-with a species grown mainly for timber and resins, both destined for national and/or global markets. Managing pine to maximize timber and resin production for a global market was something that professional foresters were trained to do. Local knowledge of oak forests and all the various techniques for managing them may have little use in this landscape. If locals decide now to reestablish oak forests, will younger generations with little direct experience managing forests and subject to the same prejudices of modernization as many government officials have the practical knowledge of forests that their ancestors had?
26 Even if they do, these may not be adequate to assure restoration of the oak forests to their former state. The techniques needed to restore a forest are often very different from those needed to maintain it in a healthy state. Finally, local communities may lack the skills to undertake all aspects of the management of pine, having served primarily as laborers to this point in time. The forests have changed, and with them the skills needed for management.
Similarly, there are many reports of the breakdown of local institutions during periods of (putative) state control over forests. 27 Colonial administrations used a mix of strategies to deal with local institutions. Often they were quite hostile to institutions embedded in local histories and cultures, and undermined their power through "tax policies, land seizures, transportation building, and the creation of new leaders accountable to the colonizers." 28 At other times, indirect rule was used to bring existing leaders under colonial influence, often redefining their role. In either case, common property institutions were badly affected. 29 Such institutions depend on high levels of trust among participants, as well as very clear decisionmaking mechanisms that require active maintenance. As states claimed control of what had been common pool forests and began punishing local forest users for violating state regulations, forest users often turned away from their own institutions and began treating the forest as an open access resource. 30 The question remains of whether local, traditional institutions can survive in a new social and economic context. Forests have attracted multiple interests, and local forest users are often forced to negotiate with them over forest management practices. 31 Though negotiating with outsiders may have been part of the work of traditional institutions, it is unlikely that earlier negotiations took place among the same array of actors and interests. Many believe that local people will be at a tremendous disadvantage unless their capacity to negotiate with others is improved. 32 Local institutions must also know how to manage for the market while respecting other local values associated with the forest. This has proven quite difficult as the skills-and values and temperaments-involved are often quite different. 33 Accounting for public grants, interpreting policy and legal reforms, and handling public media may also be beyond current local capacities in some areas.
Devolution policy transfers authority for forest management to households or individuals in China, requiring different mechanisms for adjudicating disputes and for curbing excessive social differentiation. 34 Demarcating and categorizing forested land types in China, for example, has become highly contested and subject to abuse by local elites. 35 Disputes over rights to trees can also develop based on where they are located, who planted and cared for them, whose crops are shaded by them, what is considered just compensation for tree damage, etc. When local institutions for settling such disputes are not in place, private owners may be discouraged from managing their trees. In many places, there also were traditional mechanisms for enforcing secondary use rights on private property that helped assure access to important forest products by women, the landless, and other disadvantaged groups. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are disappearing in many forested areas under pressures from the state to register all property rights to individuals. Introduction likely to fail. Debate rages, however, over whether traditional institutions should be reestablished or new ones created in these areas, and how either task can be accomplished. Many studies now indicate that institutions with extended local histories can be terribly oppressive of women, ethnic minorities, particular castes and classes, and immigrants. 37 Revitalizing this kind of institution would run counter to the (presumed) democratic intent of devolution. Yet new institutions often fail to take hold in communities. As Don Gilmore and Bob Fisher pointed out several years ago, "one of the interesting paradoxes of community forestry is that governments, almost by their nature, lack the capacity to set up sustainable community institutional structures, though they continually try to do so." 38 As suggested by Malla, Forest User Groups in Nepal often reproduce the patterns of local dominance that have existed for many years in a community, failing to empower the local poor as promised. Evidence from India suggests that the committees established under the Joint Forest Management program have also frequently failed, though Guha is guardedly optimistic about their potential. Some investment in local institutional development almost always will be needed to make devolution serve the needs of poor forest users, but the state has a mixed record in this work. 39 Fortunately, other actors are stepping up their activities and may be able to help local users build their capacity, either instead of or in conjunction with the state.
Mobilizing and Alliance Building in Pursuit of Democratic Forest Management
Migdal suggests that to counter the "Triangle of Accommodation" among local bureaucrats, elites and the national state, local mobilization is necessary, both to compel local officials to implement devolution policies and to help individuals resist pressures from local elites. 40 Pressures of this sort in the forestry sector have existed for some time, as Guha makes clear, but have become increasingly influential with the general strengthening of civil society in Asia, as in much of the world. 41 Guha shows that the arguments in favor of devolution were around for a long time in India but were not put into practice on a large scale until forest users mobilized to demand change in forest policy. D. Gilmore and R. Fisher describe how the Forum for the Poor in Thailand has advocated community forestry in Thailand, against strong resistance from the Royal Forest Department and some environmental NGOs: "One could postulate that unless community based natural resource management initiatives develop into broadly based social movements, they are unlikely to be politically and institutionally sustainable in the long term." 42 While certainly not a sufficient condition, local mobilization may be necessary to make devolution reach its most democratic forms.
In many places, mobilization is institutionalized through apex organizations, federations of forest user groups and smallholders, second-level organizations, and a variety of other super-local organizations. 43 Often the initial incentive for this kind of institutionalized mobilization is to help forest users lobby more effectively for policy changes that would enable them to exercise more control over forest management. In Nepal, as Malla indicates, FECOFUN has demanded that the government step up the pace of registration of Forest User Groups and extend registration to the commercially valuable terai forests. Much of this local advocacy taps into a global dialogue about indigenous rights, democracy, and environmental stewardship that links the external and internal pressures on states in a way that is difficult to resist. International indigenous peoples organizations, for example, have been used as a basis for criticizing national governments, multinational companies, donors, and international trade organizations. 44 Political work remains an important task of nearly all large-scale organizations of local forest users. Such organizations, however, can also help forest users address technical and organizational issues. In fact, A. Bebbington argues that for many of these large-scale organizations to survive in the long term, they will have to address technical and organizational issues, as these threaten local livelihoods even after rights to manage resources have been won. 45 Federations and cooperatives in India, for example, have been involved in securing markets for their member organizations and in arranging for technical training. 46 Mobilization can thus address the problem of a lack (or loss) of local capacity to manage forests in new ecological and institutional conditions, as well as "holdover" resistance to devolution.
Mobilization of forest users is far from problem-free. To begin with, local organizations often must put aside historical antagonisms among potential members. This is certainly possible but often takes considerable time and effort from local leaders and/or outside facilitators. As P. Evans remarks:
Social identities are constructed and reconstructed on a regular basis and can be reconstructed in ways that enhance prospects for synergy. . . . In Mexico, villagers who define their interests in terms of defending traditional land rights against infringements by neighbors in adjacent villages can also see themselves as peasants who need to cooperate with other communities in order to defend themselves against landowners and the impersonal forces of commodity markets. In Kerala, members of particular subcastes and religious communities can also see themselves as landless laborers who need to unite across caste and community boundaries in order to get out from underneath the indignities of feudal patronclient relations. New definitions of identity and interest have to be built on new experiences and interaction, but they can be constructed in years rather than in decades or centuries. 47 As Malla's work suggests, once established, large-scale organizations still face questions about how representative they are of constituents, and whether they are truly downwardly accountable. 48 Nested organizations, which replicate and are linked to decision-making processes of those organizations lower down the hierarchy, have a better chance of maintaining their legitimacy and efficacy with forest users than those that stand detached from local organizations. 49 Even if the leadership of larger organizations initially represents constituents effectively, however, the process of dealing with outsiders may professionalize them in ways that distance them from the forest users for whom they claim to speak. 50 These larger organizations need to put mechanisms in place-elections, consultation requirements, sabbaticals, audits, and Introduction others-that keep them in touch with forest users. Without them, their legitimacy and efficacy is limited, as Magno and Malla illustrate.
Mobilization need not be always and ever antagonistic towards the state or even local elites. Ricardo Ramirez describes how forest "stakeholders" often alternate between confrontational and accommodating approaches to each other. 51 Negotiations and compromises often follow periods of intense and damaging conflict between the state and forest users. Yet the threat of protests, lobbying, media campaigns, and/or independent and unauthorized action on forest management is necessary to keep more powerful parties honest. 52 The development of self-initiated forest protection groups in Orissa, for example, has helped bring the state government to the bargaining table with peoples' organizations. 53 To be effective in either negotiation or confrontation, poor forest users must be able to act together in a forceful way-they must be mobilized.
Just how and why the poor are mobilized and stay mobilized are complex questions and are treated at length in the literature on social movements. 54 Magno suggests that in the Philippines, the presence of other groups mobilized around democratic struggles sparked forest users to action. K. Brown and S. Rosario discuss the role of outsiders in catalyzing mobilizations around the idea of sustainable development, though as Malla discusses for Nepal, the organizations generated in this way may be more show than content. 55 Others emphasize the importance of strong "traditional" institutions, a history of collective struggle and sense of distinct cultural identity under threat from outside forces. 56 Economic and political crisis, in which state structures are considerably weakened, may also lead to an opportunistic kind of popular mobilization. 57 The state itself can play an important role in mobilizing the poor to collective action by providing financial, technical, and logistical support for nascent organizations, though as Liu and Malla make clear, state involvement is often counterproductive. 58 Debating the relative strengths and weaknesses of these different processes is beyond the scope of this introduction. Local mobilization is increasing in many forested areas and has an important impact on how devolution policies are designed and implemented. Devolution policies must acknowledge and work with, rather than against, such mobilization.
NGOs have become important players in environment and development politics over the past two decades or so and represent an important potential ally for mobilized groups of poor forest users. 59 Unfortunately, much of the growth in NGO influence has been limited to service provision. This follows the pressure on states to privatize government services. Siddhartha Sen suggests in fact that the state has actively encouraged the development of a "shadow government" in India, based on the work of NGOs formed by former bureaucrats, young professionals looking for job opportunities, or other politically "neutral" actors. 60 Magno describes the explosion of such well-connected and minimally critical NGOs in the Philippines. Even NGOs with a history of antagonism to government have been brought under government control. The pressure to register with the state, and accept its discipline, is great. The lure of government funding for NGO activities, and the associated government control, also has been difficult to resist.
The consequences of such developments can be far-reaching. As Magno suggests, these new-era, service-oriented NGOs absorb much of the financing available to support community-based forest management in the Philippines. In fact, NGOs are increasingly criticized for leading comfortable lifestyles, often reflecting a class background very different than that of the forest users with which they work. 61 Despite such resources, in situations where fundamental change is required and where consistent effort is needed over many years to bring about change, NGOs are often not up to the task. As M. Moore and A. Joshi suggest, the activities of the new NGOs are often "small scale and dispersed, and frequently experimental, temporary and unstable." 62 Bebbington has also argued that while many NGOs are capable of political organization, few have the technical skills that are needed to support community-based resource management today. 63 The new NGOs can also undermine the efforts of other, more locally embedded institutions struggling for greater control over resources. Upwardly accountable and financially dependent, they are unable to confront the government on such crucial issues as corruption or tenure reform, yet seize the mantle of community representatives. In some cases, they have begun to openly oppose more democratic reforms. The increasingly tense relationship between many NGOs and their supposed clients is evidence of the change in their role in restructuring state-society relations. 64 Still, empowerment-oriented NGOs have played an important role as catalysts in assuring that devolution policies were developed in the first place. Magno describes how national NGOs in the Philippines were heavily involved in writing policy recognizing relatively radical community-based forestry and indigenous resource management rights. In Nepal, foreign NGOs were an important driving force behind policy change. 65 NGOs have also played a decisive role in the implementation of more democratic devolution policy, and often must if policy is to be more than a spectacle. Forestry departments have simply not had the mandate or capacity to do so themselves, even if the will was there. One of the principal tasks of NGOs has been to help poorer forest users appeal to higher authorities for relief when local elites refuse to recognize the former's newly won management rights. NGOs have also been useful in spreading the word about policy change, providing technical assistance for forest users, and promoting institutional development within and across communities. 66 Gilmore and Fisher argue that it is characteristic of exploratory and consolidating stages in the development of community forestry that NGOs must take on such roles, mediating between states and communities as the balance of labor and decision-making authority among actors shifts. 67 Eventually, poorer forest users may develop their own organizations and social movements to deal with such issues and no longer will need NGO mediators. In many countries, however, that day has not yet come.
The empowerment-oriented NGOs face a difficult task in mediating between states and forest users. Though coalitions across NGO and government institutions can be very helpful, they face considerable obstacles related to differences in modes of deliberation, commitments to plans and schemes, and poor levels of trust with each other developed over years of antagonism. 68 Links with forest users are just as tenuous. Introduction
Upward accountability and financial dependence have widened the gap between NGOs and their clients, while the more opportunistic of the service-oriented NGOs have tarnished the reputation of NGOs generally. 69 Perhaps the most serious threat comes from those who have a strong interest in opposing devolution. At the local level, as Sen suggests, there is hostility of politicians, party workers, local elites, lower level bureaucrats, and lower level employees of the state toward NGO activity. This is especially true for rural areas, where the projects of empowerment oriented NGOs oppose the power nexus and interests of the lower levels of bureaucracy and local elites, creating antagonism toward such NGOs. . . . Local power structures pose problems even for NGOs that are implementing the state's development programmes. Proper implementation of these programmes may alter material conditions, access to resources and information, status, and positions of power, thereby threatening the existing power structure at the local level. 70 How NGOs deal with these difficulties will determine their eventual role in devolution processes, and how long they play that role. Cases from the Philippines, Nepal, and India discussed in this issue suggest that the emergence of NGOs has been critical to the success of those few communities where devolution has improved the lives of the poor. There is much room for improvement, however, in making NGOs more accountable to forest users, more efficient in the use of resources, and more effective in mediating between states and their citizens.
The rise of donor influence on government policy makers over the past two decades is also well recognized. As Hirschmann states, "what has made this period materially different for the bureaucracy is that the serious, sometimes chronic indebtedness of governments has allowed for a substantially increased level of leverage and overt intervention on the part of donors." 71 Malla suggests that donor pressure has motivated much of the reform in Nepal's forest policy. He argues that during periods when geopolitical considerations made donors reluctant to alienate the government of Nepal, minimal, often cosmetic, reforms were accepted by donors. Since the end of the cold war, donors have been more aggressive with the government. Still, forestry officials have been able to resist the most far-reaching reforms, such as extension of community forestry to the terai, or community involvement in timber management, or capacity building among forest user groups. Donors have thus far accepted reports of increasing registration of forest user groups and improvements in forest cover in the middle hills as signs of progress. Donor influence then, has translated into limited reform. Magno and Malla suggest that donor influence in the Philippines and Nepal has had similar results. Donor funding for social forestry, community-based forest management, and other such devolution initiatives has led to a proliferation of projects that may have improved forest cover but have provided limited benefits to forest users.
In contrast, donor influence appears to have been more muted in India and China. Strong, centralized forest bureaucracies have resisted external pressures for change. That may be changing, however, as both countries increase their participation in international trade and investment. Reports from India, for example, suggest significant World Bank involvement in the extension of the Joint Forest Management program in Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradesh. 72 China, too, has reviewed forestry policy in collaboration with the World Bank in recent years. Donors are clearly actors whose influence over forest policy has increased of late. That influence is uneven and often accepts limited reform, but it can play a significant role in pushing devolution forward. 73 Even government officials can be important allies for the poorest forest users. As Guha makes clear, government officials have never been unified in opposition to devolution. Today, stories of individual government officials-both capital city policy makers and field-level staff-advocating for far-reaching reform are common. 74 In some cases, the new ideas call for the empowerment of forest users in the name of democratic governance. Magno describes how government officials in the Aquino era were more open to an agenda to empower communities in a number of areas, including expanding their forest management rights. Ideas about technical efficacy can also support devolution. Guha suggests that many foresters were swayed by arguments that if communities were involved, forests would be better rehabilitated and protected than under government control alone, and at less cost. While this can lead to something akin to an argument for contract forestry, it can also support calls for more genuine, democratic devolution. 75 Where do such progressive officials come from? Merilee Grindle and John Thomas suggest that officials are often motivated by interests other than simply retaining power or succumbing to the temptations of legal or corrupt means of securing material gain. "Instead, they [bureaucratic decisions] may be the result of prior experience in the problem or policy area, professional expertise in a particular discipline, personal values, ideology, or study, debate, and discussion among a group of individuals concerned with similar issues." 76 Of course, the power of ideas about scientific, centralized forestry to hold the minds of government foresters is still formidable, as our cases demonstrate. Still, years of experience with the failures of centralized control to adequately protect forests or deliver benefits to local populations encouraged some Indian foresters to search for a way of devolving significant control to forest users. 77 Debates with donors, expatriate consultants, and each other encouraged foresters in Nepal to think in new ways about devolution. 78 Officials can think outside the bounds of the dominant discourse of centralized forestry, against the weight of decades of belief in scientific, centralized forestry. 79 Often, progressive officials face considerable obstacles from their colleagues within the state and powerful private interests. Evans, citing the work of Fox on rural reform in Mexico, notes that "while parts of the state were 'coproducing' autonomous associations of rural peasants, other parts of the state were working with rural élites to suppress the same organizations. Reformists were always engaged in an implicit or explicit struggle against politically authoritarian groups within the state apparatus and their private allies." Introduction support for management decisions taken by communities, households, and individuals. In India, though devolution generally has been quite problematic, regulations are being repealed in some areas, and foresters are taking on the role of supporting management decisions taken by local people on species selection, marketing, benefit sharing, and the like. 81 A critical mass of progressive officials may be forming in some states, and this can push devolution policy forward in ways that serve the interests of the poorest forest users. Even in the days of strong, central control over forests designed to maximize the production of a single product from single species of trees, management was sufficiently complex and uncertain to frustrate forest policy makers. Policies mandating plot and lab-tested production techniques were undermined by unforeseen relationships between insects and disease, understories and soil fertility. Regulations on forest access were undone by the creativity of people finding new ways to graze animals, collect wood, or set fires in the forest. 83 No amount of pre-policy assessment, planning, or scientific debate could assure forest policy outcomes with any certainty. Today, devolution policies introduce further uncertainties and complexities into the management of forests. How management roles will be shared among different actors, what the interests and capacities of those actors will be, and what the outcomes of this restructuring of state-society relations in forestry will be for forests and people is uncertain. Forest management has become more complex because it must take better account of the multiple interests in forests and allow for a greater number of groups to take part in making management decisions. 84 The only reasonable approach to policy making has been and is increasingly to accept the uncertainty and complexity and put into place mechanisms for monitoring, analyzing, and adapting policies in a timely and efficient manner. 85 In other words, we need a learning-oriented approach to devolving forest management authority to communities and individuals. 86 One justification for devolution is, in fact, that it allows for management to adapt to local complexities, and bounds management uncertainties by focusing decision making at a smaller scale. 87 Not all governments seem to take this justification to heart. State officials in India are trying to standardize local institutions for resource management, bringing van panchayats in Uttar Pradesh and self-initiated forest protection committees in Orissa under the JFM umbrella. 88 As Malla and Magno illustrate, the registration of forest management plans in Nepal and the Philippines also standardizes practices without respect to local conditions. Where devolution has not shifted much decision-making authority to the local level, it has not been very sensitive to local social and environmental conditions. More importantly, shifting scale is not the same as adopting a learning approach. A learning-oriented approach encourages policy makers to design policies to be reversible, to plan for surprise, and to allow for innovation. It involves collecting, analyzing, and acting on new information. In the context of local forest manage-ment, where multiple interests must work together, it requires processes that facilitate the communication of knowledge, experiences, values, and beliefs among different groups. 89 That is, it requires a joint or social learning approach. 90 Shifting decision making to local scales can make learning easier, but it is not enough to assure that policy is learning-oriented. 91 Putting a learning-oriented approach to policy making into practice is more difficult than describing what it might look like. Chinese officials, for example, have clearly honored the commitments to reversibility of policy. With policies pertaining to shareholding systems, they have taken a circumspect, small-scale approach initially (at least within the Chinese context). As Liu points out, however, the learning was not social, nor was it effective. Policy makers did not consult farmers adequately and drew the wrong conclusions from the evidence they did gather. In the Philippines, officials have developed a range of policy instruments over the last two decades to devolve authority for forest management to communities and individuals. Clearly some learning has gone on-for example, later policies addressed tenure questions more directly. The learning also seems to have been social, as NGOs and various peoples' organizations have had some into policy developments. Yet as Magno suggests, a lack of careful monitoring and systematic analysis cast doubts on the effectiveness of this learning.
There are also questions concerning the costs of a learning-oriented approach. When formal experiments are organized on forested lands, they can, through their emphasis on controlling the influence of variables outside the scope of the experiment, undermine the everyday adjustments that forest users make to their environment. 92 Social learning, in particular among large numbers of diverse forest interest groups, can also involve significant transaction costs for participants. 93 Finally, a learning approach may undermine attempts by forest users to mobilize themselves to address an urgent problem. Moore and Joshi are particularly skeptical of the kinds of social learning organized by NGOs: "To the NGO staffers and their funders, flexibility and experimentation are positive values that constitute 'learning experiences.' To potential social activists these same values are disabling, for the central role of NGOs undermines the scope for mobilisation of the poor around programme implementation." 94 And as Liu reports, the constant back and forth of policy adjustments in China has had a devastating effect on farmer-official relations.
Social learning approaches are in their infancy, particularly with respect to policy developments. 95 There are indications, however, that it can help improve policy design and implementation. James Mayers and Steve Bass comment that "collaborative management approaches in forestry are in some cases-such as Ghana, Zimbabwe and parts of India-being treated as collaborative learning processes. The learning element is critical: policy experiments cannot be whims, but require deliberate monitoring by stakeholders with different views, and an open process to consider adaptation and review." 96 The cases here indicate that there is still a long way to go in making forest policy more adaptive. We believe that there is much to be gained from pursuing that end. Introduction
Conclusion
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
The papers in this issue of Environmental History provide clear explanations for why devolution policies have failed in many ways to address the needs of the poor and why they have done better in a few others. Failures are in part due to the lack of attention in policy development to important historical "holdovers." In Nepal and the Philippines in particular, elite/subordinate relations at the local level have distorted the outcome of fairly progressive policies. In all four countries, government ideologies and institutional arrangements favoring centralized control have been slow to change. As a result, policies that appear to cede control over forest management to forest users are contradicted by other policies, or undermined in the implementation process. However, where pressure has been brought to bear on these holdovers, often by relatively new or newly influential actors, progress has been better. The activities of NGOs in parts of India and the Philippines, donors in Nepal, or mobilized forest users in different locations in all four countries have helped close the gap between forest policy rhetoric-proclaiming improved livelihoods for and political empowerment of the poor-and the realities of forest management practice.
At the same time, the papers indicate that changes in ecological and social environments since the early days of colonial forestry have not always been adequately considered in the design or implementation of devolution policies. Capacity to manage forests at the local level cannot be assumed to exist at present, as forests and the people and institutions that played a role in their management have changed. Policies must include scope for building capacity at the local level to deal with these new conditions. States can play a positive role in this process, as they have in parts of India and China in particular. But they are unlikely to perform the task well on their own. The involvement of mobilized forest users and associated NGOs will be necessary to assure that locals, especially the poor, can effectively take up the tasks of forest management that are to be formally shed by the state.
Designing and implementing policies that address these holdovers and new conditions will be no easy task. Many mistakes will be made, as the authors suggest. A learning-oriented approach to policy, where poor forest users play an integral role in deciding how to evaluate policy success or failure, and where evaluations are done in a timely and efficient manner, is called for. Many thanks to Mike Arnold, Madhu Sarin, and Neera Singh for providing comments on earlier drafts. They certainly helped a lot, and any shortcomings in this article are the sole responsibility of the authors. Mike Arnold also provided comments to the authors of the other articles in this issue. Finally, many of the ideas for this article emerged from discussions with Antonio Contreras, Liu Dachang, Govind Kelkar, Dev Nathan, Madhu Sarin, and Neera Singh as part of CIFOR's "Creating Space for Local Forest Management" project. We appreciate their contributions.Introduction
